Guterres' Men in Western Sahara: Can Dialogue Be Resumed?
INSIGHT. The appointment of Staffan de Mistura as António Guterres' Personal Envoy for Western Sahara seeks to put an end to the long-standing conflict.
On November 1, Staffan de Mistura took up his post as Secretary-General António Guterres' Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, with the difficult task of mediating between the parties to the conflict over the -still considered by the UN- non-self-governing territory.
Difficult choice and questioned profile
The appointment of this important post has been a very long process of almost two and a half years in which up to thirteen personalities of the highest level have been considered, successively rejected by one side or the other because of their alleged closeness to the contrary. De Mistura was thus chosen from a final shortlist of candidates which included the former Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman and the former Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis Amado, whom the Polisario opposed on the grounds that they were close to Rabat.
In the case of De Mistura, the daily Jeune Afrique reported that it was Rabat which was initially reluctant to accept the diplomat because of his record as a mediator in military conflicts, believing that such a profile could contribute to the Polisario's "institutional communication campaign" on the existence of an "open war", denied by Morocco. Nor would Rabat like the fact that De Mistura would supposedly be in favor of a two-sided negotiation, since for the Moroccan government it is essential that Algeria also be involved in the discussions. However, Morocco finally accepted in the hope that his appointment would serve to reach a "political, realistic, lasting and consensual solution to the conflict".
An experienced 73-year-old Italian-Swedish diplomat, De Mistura has participated in nearly 30 UN missions and has enjoyed the confidence of previous UN Secretaries-General, who appointed him Personal Representative for South Lebanon (2001-2004), Special Representative for Iraq (2007-2009) and for Afghanistan (2010-2011) and Personal Envoy for Syria (2014-2019). True to the stereotype of the old-school diplomat, with his aristocratic appearance and rigorous suit, after a brief experience in Italian politics as Deputy Foreign Minister he was Director of Operations of a luxury villa in Capri, where he hoped to enjoy his retirement until he received a call from former Secretary General Ban Ki Moon.
After his successful work in Afghanistan and Iraq - for which he was even praised by President Obama - his work in Syria seems to have received equal parts praise and reproach, as reported by The Guardian. He was criticized for failing to bring the opposition to the peace talks, for focusing too much on obtaining small truces (the director of Human Rights Watch accused him of engaging in "quixotic local ceasefire efforts" while forgetting the "big picture") and, above all, for preferring former collaborators to true specialists in the region. The New York Times' Somini Sengupta called him "more widely known for his dapper style than for any diplomatic coups" and quoted sources who acknowledged that "he can speak too soon and too much" or censured "his diplomatic missteps and hyperbole." And his own political director - who resigned and became one of his biggest detractors - branded him in the British tabloid as lacking the competence for the job and quickly losing the confidence of key players: "Rather than play it straight, he had a tendency to tell those he meets what they want to hear, and worry about the consequences later".
Despite the fierce criticism, De Mistura's courage in taking on the "toughest job in the world" of mediating negotiations that were doomed to failure due to the antagonistic positions of the major world powers has also been praised, especially after his two predecessors (including former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan) resigned in frustration at the lack of progress. The secretary general of the Norwegian Refugee Council went so far as to commend his "Herculean effort" and the Italian-Swedish man's contribution in making the negotiation process more inclusive by incorporating civil society groups and women. He is seen as an innovative and creative diplomat, less constrained than his predecessors by the rigidities of the UN, as well as deeply sensitive to the struggles of civilians and refugees. Despite his values and praised talents, after just over four years without the expected success De Mistura resigned for "purely personal reasons" which he never explained and which we trust will not affect his new commitment to resolving the conflict.
The other men on the ground
De Mistura joins the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), Russian Alexander Ivanko, who was also appointed this year to replace Canadian Colin Stewart. Although not much information has come to light about his work - beyond the CV on the UN website - he has extensive international experience and has been MINURSO's Chief of Staff since 2009, so he is well acquainted with the conflict and the tensions between the parties in the vast territory under the Mission's scrutiny. A journalist by training, he worked as a correspondent in Afghanistan and the US for a Russian newspaper, was UN spokesperson in Bosnia in difficult years (1994-1999), then OSCE Special Adviser and returned to the Balkan region as Director of the UN Office of Public Information in Kosovo (2006-2009).
His nomination was apparently well received by both sides, without much analysis - and certainly no misgivings - in the media on either side. Thus, Moroccan analyst Mohamed Tajeddine Houssaini stated in the daily Le360 that his appointment will "improve the role of the Mission" and "allow him to better understand and manage the work of MINURSO", after the "lack of rigour" of some of its actions. Ivanko was already received last September by Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, but has not yet met with the Polisario Front.
He is joined on Guterres' team by Pakistani Major-General Zia Ur Rehman, commander of the UN forces (blue helmets), who also has extensive international experience, including as a military observer in the UN Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). He was appointed in 2019 to replace Chinese General Xiaojun Wang as second-in-command of the 235-strong MINURSO contingent from 39 countries, comprising military observers (208), troops (27 from Bangladesh and Ghana) and civilian police (currently none).
The problem that has been blamed on the UN mission (recently extended for another year by the Security Council) is that it has established itself as a mere observer of non-compliance with the agreements by both parties, as its scant personnel and resources make it impossible to carry out effective peacekeeping along a wall of more than 2,700 kilometres. Thus, its official mandate is limited to monitoring the ceasefire, reducing the threat of mines and explosive devices and, for some years now, providing logistical support to the UNHCR (whose action was, however, suspended in 2014). On the other hand, it has been criticised that the mission does not even monitor respect for human rights - as other UN missions do - as this task has been expressly removed from its list of functions. In this regard, despite the fact that in its resolution 2548(2020) the Security Council urged the parties to cooperate more closely with the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the truth is that this body - according to Guterres himself - "has been unable to conduct any visits to the territory for the sixth consecutive year".
What has been done so far
De Mistura's task of getting the negotiations back on track will be a difficult one, and the Italian-Swedish man will find it difficult to achieve the same success as his predecessor.
It is not for nothing that German President Horst Köhler, in office from 2017 to 2019, achieved significant progress in the peace process in just two years, in stark contrast to his predecessor - the American Christopher Ross - who, despite occupying the post for more than eight years, failed to hold a real official dialogue table (beyond several rounds of "informal" talks) and was forced to leave office after being described as "pro-Polisario" by Morocco, which considered his work "unbalanced and biased", as early as 2012.
The truth is that the process is at a clear impasse that is difficult to move forward given the strongly conflicting positions. After the Baker Plan I (accepted by Morocco, rejected by the Polisario) and II (approved by the Security Council despite Rabat's rejection of a final referendum on independence), in 2007 both sides launched their own versions of a solution: on the one hand, the Front's proposal "for a mutually acceptable political solution" (in which it simply reiterated its adherence to Baker II) and, on the other, the "Moroccan Initiative for the negotiation of a Statute of Autonomy for the Sahara Region" (presented a day later and based on the Baker I Plan). Since then, no alternative solution has been announced by either side, although the path to a plebiscite and full independence seems increasingly distant, given that the Security Council's own resolutions have not spoken of a referendum for years.
Despite the apparent deadlock, Köhler enjoyed the respect of the parties (including the neighbours) and succeeded in bringing them to the dialogue table twice. Thus, in December 2018 and March 2019, two rounds of talks were held in Geneva, with representation from Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and the Polisario Front. There, the parties highlighted the different atmosphere compared to previous meetings and expressed their willingness to maintain the dialogue in the near future. Guterres himself seemed optimistic but cautious because of "mutual mistrust", urging the international community to engage robustly in order to "find a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution".
The good tone of dialogue achieved seemed to be muddied when in April 2019 Morocco sent Personal Envoy Köhler a letter demanding greater engagement from Algeria, claiming that Rabat had already presented a proposal for a resolution of the conflict and demanding that the other side show 'the same commitment and demonstrate a real desire to move towards a solution'. Just a month later, the dynamics of apparent understanding came to a standstill for no apparent reason when the Personal Envoy resigned for "health reasons".
A complicated outlook
In his latest report on the situation in Western Sahara to the Security Council, Guterres used the much-used expression of "deeply concerned" that has been used by senior diplomats to express their concern about certain events without being forced to take a position in favour of one side or the other, thus avoiding possible reprisals. Indeed, the situation has degenerated enormously since the resignation of Personal Envoy Köhler in May 2019 and makes Staffan de Mistura's work very difficult.
In these 29 months, several events have increased the tension between the parties, finding their first milestone in the El Guerguerat clashes of November 2020, when the Moroccan army forcibly evicted Saharawi protesters blocking the road linking the Moroccan-controlled area with Mauritania - across a strip supposedly demilitarised by the 1991 peace accords.
Read our analysis of November 2020
This incursion provoked the warlike reaction of the Polisario, which unilaterally declared the end of the ceasefire and the resumption of the conflict, initiating what Guterres describes as "low-intensity hostilities" which, of course, are observed differently by the parties. As the report states, while for the Polisario Front "the entire territory of Western Sahara has become an open war zone", Morocco insists on the "total absence of armed conflict". In any case, the Mission is unable to verify the alleged clashes, for although its action to the west of the wall remains normal, to the east the Polisario has placed many impediments, which it claims are "necessary to guarantee the security of MINURSO personnel given the state of war".
A month after the incidents, in the last days of his presidency Donald Trump signed a presidential order recognising Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara, in return for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Rabat and Tel Aviv as an extension of the Abraham Accords. US recognition allowed Morocco to launch a diplomatic offensive to bring other countries on board, but rejection by European capitals degenerated into diplomatic clashes with Germany and Spain (added to the treatment of Polisario leader Brahim Ghali in a Spanish hospital and the ensuing migration crisis in Ceuta). Despite Western rejection, up to fourteen countries have in this period expressed their desire to open a consular delegation in Laayoune or Dakhla in support of Moroccan aspirations, and Colombia has even been the first South American country to "extend the consular jurisdiction of its embassy in Morocco" to the territory of Western Sahara.
In addition to the strictly territorial conflict, there is growing hostility between Morocco and Algeria, the Polisario Front's traditional and main international supporter. Rabat's public support for the Kabylie people's (Berber group) demands for self-determination would be part of what the Tebboune government describes as "incessant hostile acts" towards Algeria, in addition to the accusation of being behind the various fires that the country suffered this summer. As a result, the severance of diplomatic relations was announced in August, followed in September by a ban on Moroccan flights crossing Algerian airspace. Tensions have risen considerably in recent days, following Algeria's withdrawal from the talks on the Sahara, the closure of the gas pipeline linking the two countries that carries gas to Europe through the Strait of Gibraltar - through which Rabat not only obtained free gas but also transit fees worth hundreds of millions of euros - and, this week, the alleged bombing of three Algerian trucks east of the wall, which Algiers accuses Rabat of.
The third major bone of contention concerns Morocco's exploitation of Western Sahara's resources. The recent ruling by the EU's General Court, annulling trade agreements with Morocco for seeking to extend into the territory without the consent of the people of Western Sahara, has not deterred Rabat, which is convinced that the decision will be appealed by European governments. Moreover, the Moroccan government would be granting Israeli companies the right to explore for oil and gas in the waters adjacent to the territory.
Maghrebia
Read our analysis of the judgments
It is in this high-temperature context that the brand new Personal Envoy is expected to operate. Certainly, his appointment has been accepted by the international community as a necessary step towards resuming dialogue. The welcome offered by Secretary of State Blinken, who pledges to "actively support his efforts to promote a peaceful and prosperous future for the people of Western Sahara and the region", is noteworthy in this regard. Surprisingly, Washington is backing him to "resuming the UN-led political process" while Trump's declaration recognising Moroccan sovereignty - which Biden has not yet reversed - remains formally in place, which disregarded any negotiated UN-sponsored self-determination process.
In this complex scenario of strongly conflicting positions, multiple geopolitical implications and -let us not forget- hundreds of thousands of people pending their future for more than thirty years, the new Personal Envoy will have to show his experience and try to re-launch the dialogue to reach a "realistic, practical, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution" -in the terms used by the latest Security Council resolution 2602(2021). The volatile context and deep mistrust between the parties involved will force De Mistura to walk a fine line, where the slightest stumble could lead him to be labelled "pro-Morocco" or "pro-Polisario".
Much of the success of his mission will therefore depend on whether, at 73 years of age, he still considers himself, as he did in the past, the same "chronic optimist".
