Spain Abandons its Neutrality on Western Sahara: Historical Mistake or 'Realpolitik'?
REPORT. Spanish decision to back the Moroccan Autonomy Plan for the Western Sahara has raised some questions about its opportunity and necessity.
The conflict in Ukraine
The Russian invasion of the former Soviet republic was probably one of the factors that triggered the events. First, because the media attention that this conflict has attracted meant that the step taken by Spain remained in the background, with few references beyond our borders. Second, because it has forced the contenders, Morocco and Algeria (the main advocate of self-determination for the Sahara) to position themselves on the international scene, temporarily altering their traditional game of alliances.
On the one hand, Rabat surprised its Western partners by not being present at the motion of condemnation of the Russian invasion promoted at the UN General Assembly, nor did it take an express position on the conflict as a member of the Arab League. Apparently, Morocco would not want to antagonize a permanent member of the Security Council (with veto power over any resolution on the matter) when it sees its objective in Western Sahara (which it considers its "Southern Provinces") approaching. The side position adopted by Rabat would have caused some concern in Washington, although it has avoided publicly criticizing the move in the face of the pressing need to strengthen the group of countries of the Abraham Accords. Similarly, Morocco's silence has not been censured by other Western chancelleries, and only led to the recall of the Ukrainian ambassador to Morocco for consultations because of her "inability to defend the country's interests".
For its part, Algiers has found itself in a compromising situation as a result of the Russian invasion. Its traditional relationship with Moscow, the main supporter and arms supplier to the former French colony, means that its Western partners are keeping a close eye on its movements. Far from expressly backing the offensive, it chose to abstain in the UN condemnation vote, in what can be understood as a sign of its intention to be neutral and not to inflame either of the two poles, while positioning itself as an alternative gas supplier on the international markets in the event of a possible cut-off of Russian supplies.
Clash for Maghreb leadership
The specific moment that relations between the Maghrebi neighbors are going through also constitutes an important factor in the Spanish decision. Since the end of 2019, tensions have risen considerably between two traditional rivals seeking to take over the leadership of the region.
Moroccan assertiveness and Rabat's rapprochement with Tel Aviv in the framework of the Abraham Accords, together with the defense of the independence movement in Kabylia (which Algeria is internally confronting), led to the rupture of relations between the two countries, inflamed by other incidents such as the massive fires in Algeria (for which Morocco is blamed), the closure of airspace to Moroccan flights or the alleged bombing (denied by Rabat) of a convoy of Algerian trucks passing east of the sand wall of Western Sahara, which caused the death of three people.
Nevertheless, it has been stated that open hostility or warlike confrontation between the two countries is not likely to occur, at least under the present circumstances and as long as neither country substantially changes its behavior. Despite Algeria's continuous complaints and demonstrations of condemnation, Algerian diplomacy is characterized by its discretion and calm, and does not seem to want to alter its status too much at a global moment when its partners are demanding stability in order to increase their trade relations. Moreover, despite publicly supporting the Polisario Front and protesting against the harassment by the Moroccan army, some sources indicate that there has been no substantial increase in the supply of arms to the pro-independence militia, an aspect which could instead provoke greater bellicosity on the part of Rabat and an escalation of hostilities.
U.S. and the Abraham Accords
Third, the role that Washington may have played in the Spanish government's controversial statement has also been pointed out.
While President Biden has not explicitly endorsed his predecessor's recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, neither has there been any public opposition to Trump's presidential statement. Washington attaches great importance to its relations with Rabat, considered a strategic partner in the region and a traditional ally (it was the first country to recognize the independence of the USA), so it does not wish to jeopardize these relations by making a false move on a key dossier for Morocco.
The US also intends to strengthen the group of countries of the Abraham Accords, which Morocco joined after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. It has been pointed out that US support for Morocco's plans was a decisive element in adding Rabat to the club of Muslim states that have initiated (or re-established, in this case) diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, following the recognition made by the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan.
Thus, despite Morocco's absence from the vote condemning the Russian invasion at the UN General Assembly, Secretary of State Blinken himself has avoided any kind of censure. Quite the contrary, during his recent visit to Rabat, following Sanchez's statement, he took the opportunity to again endorse the Moroccan Autonomy Plan, which he describes as "serious, credible and realistic, and a potential approach to meet the aspirations of the people of Western Sahara", in addition to thanking the Moroccan "support" for the mission of UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura.
Not surprisingly, at the press conference following the meeting with Blinken, Minister Nasser Bourita mentioned Spain's change of position and took advantage of the U.S. backing to urge European countries to "get out of their comfort zone and adopt an active stance in the search for a solution, rather than a merely passive one of supporting the status quo".
It could therefore be deduced, despite the Spanish government's express denial, that Sanchez's new statement is in line with US policy in the so-called Strategic Dialogue with the countries of the region; not in vain, Blinken's presence was anticipated only two weeks earlier by the separate meeting of the parties with Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, who on March 7 paid a visit to Minister Albares in Madrid, the following day to Minister Bourita in Casablanca and, only two days later, visited Algiers and met with President Tebboune.
The EU position
Other analysts have pointed to Brussels as a source of pressure on Pedro Sánchez's government. At a time of unprecedented migratory crisis, when several million Ukrainians have left their country for the European Union (mainly Poland), Brussels and the Member States have reacted more quickly than in previous crises by allowing the free movement of refugees. However, the Commission is aware that the good reception given to those fleeing the war has not been usual in other cases, especially with the previous massive arrival of Syrians and Afghans. It is therefore most likely that Brussels wishes to avoid, for the time being and while the arrival of the Ukrainians is being managed, episodes of mass emigration such as those in Ceuta last year, the vast majority of which are North African or Sahelian migrants, who are received with greater opposition in Europe.
In addition, the EU has been adopting a de facto position tending to recognize, at the very least, Morocco's control of Western Sahara and its economic resources. Indeed, in recent years various economic agreements have been signed with Rabat, extending both to the waters and to the territory of the former Spanish province, in order to allow economic exploitation by European companies and the exchange of products originating there with customs benefits. The cancellation of these agreements by the General Court has not stopped the EU Commission, which has lodged an appeal before the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg, whose decision is expected in the coming months.
Read our article on the judgment
Brussels thus recognizes the key importance from an economic point of view vis-à-vis potential competitors (Russia, Israel, United Kingdom) and has so far tried to circumvent concerns about international law and human rights with the clear intention of positioning itself as Rabat's strategic partner in this respect. Thus, the High Representative Borrell have described Spain's decision as "beneficial for the implementation of the Euro-Moroccan partnership".
The role played by Germany in the step taken by the Spanish government is also unknown. The European power, in the last months of the Merkel administration, was the object of Morocco's wrath due to its reaction following Trump's statement, when Berlin requested a closed-door meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the matter. The refusal to join the US led to the severance of diplomatic relations and the withdrawal of the Moroccan ambassador. However, the investiture of the new Schultz government, with the "green" Boeleck at the head of the Foreign Affairs portfolio, brought about an immediate change (one of the first measures after taking over the ministry) in the handling of the crisis. Thus, through an official communiqué last December, it highlighted the importance of relations between the two countries (calling Morocco an "important link" and a "central partner" and congratulating it for its "key role in preserving stability and promoting sustainable development in the region"). On the issue of Western Sahara, it recognized the "important contribution" represented by the 2008 autonomy plan. Although it certainly stopped short of endorsing the Moroccan proposal as a matter of priority, as Spanish government has done, the communiqué had the intended effect, with the restoration of normal relations between the two countries. As Rabat's new ally in the center of Europe, one might wonder whether Chancellor Scholtz could have exerted some influence on Sanchez during the visit he paid him a few days before the announcement of the new approach.
Competitors in the Gibraltar Strait
The last external factor may perhaps be the appearance on the scene of other countries that could eventually become, as shown by some movements in recent months, important competitors of Spain in its essential area of influence in the Strait.
The first is the United Kingdom. After Brexit, London has been trying to position itself on the international scene with its own voice, different from that of the European Union, seeking to preserve its role as a world power once outside the EU club. To achieve this goal, and given the normal reluctance of its former partners to make its life easier, the United Kingdom is trying to find other partners among its more traditional allies, as evidenced by the AUKUS defense agreement signed with the United States and Australia. These new partners could also include Morocco, a country from which - through Gibraltar - only a few kilometers separate it on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar. In recent months, it was published that a British company would be in charge of laying a submarine cable to receive electricity from renewable sources in Morocco. In 2019, both countries signed a trade agreement that has since been extended to other areas such as defense or cybersecurity. And in relation to Western Sahara, London has backed the recent UN Security Council resolution 2602 rejecting the Polisario Front's "unilateral measures" (such as the breaking of the ceasefire following the El Guerguerat clashes).
The other actor that has recently entered the scene is Israel. Morocco's accession to the Abraham Accords has made it an important friend on the international scene. The signing of several agreements on economic and defense issues (including the delivery of drones or spy software by Tel Aviv), with the presence of Israeli ministers in Rabat, has been followed by the recent meeting with the other members of this select club (plus Egypt), in what has been interpreted as a staging of a new pole of countries seeking to have their own voice in the Middle East and North Africa. Another of them, the UAE, is becoming one of the main investors in Morocco, in addition to expressly supporting sovereignty over Western Sahara, materialized in the establishment in 2020 of a consulate in El Aaiun.
Internal factors
The media attention attracted by the war in Ukraine is also being used by Madrid to carry out a key foreign policy move. Not in vain, despite the fact that the issue has attracted extensive coverage in the national media in recent months, it is not comparable to that which could have been generated at another time of lesser world political upheaval. The monopoly by the Russian invasion of the national and global headlines means that despite the appearances of President Sanchez and Minister Albares in Congress, solved without excessive opposition, and the subsequent visit of both to the monarch during the end of Ramadan, the issue has been semi-buried among the rest of the news.
In this regard, although the left criticizes the abandonment of the Saharawis, and the right reproaches the unilateral and non-consensual abandonment of a historic foreign policy position, neither party has raised the tone too high.
The truth is that in political terms the step taken also had its obvious implications. The Spanish Government is aware that each chapter of mass migration provokes a rise of the right and extreme right, so, in a context of national elections in 2023, the Government cannot afford another summer of pateras arriving to its coasts, so it was necessary to close the crisis with Morocco and recover the collaboration in this matter.
Spain's historical position
Since its precipitous departure from the territory in 1976, Spain has maintained a public position of neutrality in relation to the future of its former colony. In this sense, despite the fact that the UN continues to consider our country as the administering power of the non-autonomous territory, Madrid has referred during the last four decades to the need for a negotiated process within the framework of the United Nations and "mutually acceptable".
However, since Morocco published its autonomy plan in 2007, and especially during the last decade, successive Spanish governments have subtly altered the terms used in their public statements. Thus, in 2012 and 2015, following high-level meetings between the two countries, the Government of Mariano Rajoy welcomed "Morocco's serious and credible efforts", in the context of Security Council Resolution 2218 and referring specifically to the Moroccan proposal for autonomy, in what could be interpreted as a step in the direction now consolidated. In addition, Spain has carried out a discreet diplomatic work in favor of Morocco, advocating behind the scenes for the Moroccan proposal and defending Rabat's interests in other forums such as the EU itself (as exemplified by the support for the EU-Morocco trade agreements and their intended extension to Western Sahara, blocked by the General Court).
The Sanchez government, following its party's (PSOE) traditional stance and surely pressured by its far-left coalition partners, initially tried to link itself back to the UN path and the need for the "mutually acceptable solution", epitomized by the various statements of former Minister Gonzalez Laya following the clashes at the Guerguerat border crossing in October 2020.
Read our article on the clashes at the Guerguerat border
Subsequently, Trump's recognition of Moroccan sovereignty led Rabat to invite Madrid to join the recognition, although the Spanish government's refusal (coupled with the reception of Polisario leader Brahim Ghali) triggered last year's migration crisis (which ended with the replacement of the minister) and the diplomatic clash that has now ended with Sanchez's statement.
Reactions in Morocco and Algeria
The reactions in the Moroccan officialist media have been welcoming to the change in Spanish policy. A few days after the press release, Rabat announced the return of Ambassador Benyaich to Madrid as well as the holding of a high-level meeting between King Mohammed VI and Pedro Sanchez (who was accompanied by Minister Albares) during the feast of the end of Ramadan.
As for Algeria, one wonders whether it knew in advance of the Spanish government's move, and whether there was any U.S. involvement in helping to calm things down in Algiers. The Algerian reaction has been as expected: calling the Spanish move a "betrayal" of the Saharawis, recalling its ambassador in Madrid for consultations, or staging its discomfort after meeting with Italy (which it has already presented as its main gas partner from now on) and stating that although it will comply with its supply agreements, it does not rule out reconsidering the prices applied to Spain. In recent weeks, moreover, Brussels was forced to intervene, calling on Algeria to respect the Association Agreement with the European Union, following the announcement by Algiers of the suspension of the Friendship Treaty signed with Madrid in 2002 and the discreet restrictions of a commercial nature by preventing direct debits of Spanish exports to that country. Although Algiers was forced to back down, even dismissing the Minister of Finance, it insists on describing as "unjustifiable" the new position of President Sanchez on the Western Sahara dossier.
In this sense, and despite this staging, experts consider that it is unlikely that in the medium term Algeria will adopt more serious retaliation against Spain using its gas reserves as a weapon. In a context in which it can establish itself as a source of energy for the entire EU and an alternative solution to the Russian gas pipelines, Algeria cannot afford to show instability and thus miss the opportunity against other competitors (Qatar or the USA, among others), taking into account the high prices of the current market. Indeed, Algeria has proven to be a reliable supplier with a reputation for compliance, having never cut off supplies to Morocco, despite the serious crisis between them, until the expiry of the current contract on the Maghreb gas pipeline (GME) at the end of last year.
Conclusions
It seems incredible how a few seemingly insignificant words can provoke the angriest reactions and a change in the international policy maintained by a country for more than 45 years. But in diplomacy, words are essential and can make the difference between cordial relations or the ultimate enmity between two countries.
The recent position taken by the Spanish Government, considering the Moroccan proposal as "the most serious, realistic and credible basis for the resolution of the dispute", gives it some preference over the Polisario alternative and alters the balance and neutrality defended by our country since its departure from the territory. Although the Government insists on calling for the resolution of the conflict within the United Nations, the truth is that a "mutually acceptable solution" is no longer urged as it has been up to now (and much less the referendum, which was ruled out from official statements some time ago), but the Moroccan option, which involves granting a certain autonomy to the territory, perpetuating the current situation, is given prevalence. For this reason, although for years Spain has maintained a discreet diplomacy of support to Morocco on the issue, and although the European Commission already maintained a de facto recognition of the Moroccan control of the territory through the commercial treaties, the truth is that it can be qualified as a historical turning point in our foreign policy (which has no parallel in our environment, not even in France) for being the first time that a preference for one of the possible solutions to the situation of the former colony has been publicly declared.
That said, why alter the status quo in this way, and does Spain gain anything from this change of position? Three months after the turnaround, we still do not know why the historic pronouncement really took place and what were the terms under which the alleged agreement with Morocco was signed. Both Albares and Sanchez have welcomed the new direction of relations with Rabat and have defended the importance of the gesture to "untangle" the Western Sahara issue and to recover cooperation with Morocco, which is key in migration and security matters and for the respect of the territorial integrity (of Ceuta and Melilla, we must understand). However, in view of the fact that the migratory flow from Morocco does not seem to have decreased excessively, many wonder what Spain has gained by taking such a transcendental step in foreign policy.
We will probably never know the exact reasons or the conditions under which this new road map has been signed with the southern neighbor. However, what we can deduce at this moment is that rather than following a clear and well-defined strategy, the Spanish government seems to have been guided by motives of strict and pure political pragmatism -or realpolitik- derived from the current circumstances, manifested in three clear areas.
On the one hand, pragmatism in terms of security in the face of the situation of vulnerability Spain would be facing due to the growing immigration from Africa and the risk posed by jihadism in the Sahel area, both aspects in which Spain (and by extension the EU) requires the close collaboration of Morocco as the main source of entry given its proximity. Such pragmatism has become evident in recent days in view of the controversial reaction of defending the action of the Moroccan border police against a violent attempt to storm the Melilla fence, in which dozens of sub-Saharan immigrants died.
Secondly, pragmatism in economic terms: although it was a risky decision due to the possibility of deteriorating relations with Algeria (our second main gas supplier), the reality is that since the beginning of this year Spain has been receiving most of its gas as LNG, especially from the US and Qatar. The presence in Spain of important regasification plants could turn our country into an important gas hub providing this energy both to the EU (in the face of the supply cut-off by Russia as a result of the conflict) and to Morocco itself through the Maghreb gas pipeline in the opposite direction. And, of course, fluid relations with Morocco may also make it possible to resume trade exchanges in important sectors for Spain, such as fishing.
Thirdly, pragmatism in political terms: the fact is that Spain abandoned Western Sahara in 1976, and although since then it has been pushing for a negotiated solution within the UN, this process has been stuck for almost 50 years under Moroccan administration of the territory and with no realistic prospect of being resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. In the meantime, hundreds of thousands of Saharawis of two or three generations continue to live in refugee camps in Algeria and, given the impossibility of consulting them (as none of the parties is willing to allow an independent consultation), we do not know what their wishes would really be. Therefore, in a context in which the US has already taken a position (and does not seem likely to back down), the most realistic (in terms of practicality alone) would probably have been to follow in their wake.
In addition, recovering relations with Morocco may allow Spain to claim its role in a key geographical region in the coming years after a time of serious geopolitical upheaval resulting from the Abraham Accords, Brexit or the foreseeable Russian isolation following its invasion of Ukraine, as well as attracting NATO's interest in the so-called southern neighborhood of the Alliance.
As we say, whether or not the historic turn taken in this 2022 was a politically wise decision for the Spanish government is something we will see in the coming years. Whether it will be revealed as an improvisation in view of the circumstances or as a masterful strategic maneuver, however, matters little now.
